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EVIDENTIARY POLICIES THROUGH OTHER MEANS: 
THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF “SUBSTANTIVE LAW” ON THE DISTRIBUTION  





This Article develops an analytical framework to investigate novel 
ways in which legal reforms disguised as “substantive” can affect 
procedural due process safeguards differently among racial groups. 
Scholars have long recognized the impact evidence rules have on 
substantive policies, such as modifying primary incentives or affecting the 
distribution of legal entitlements in society. However, legal scholars have 
not paid enough attention to the reverse effect: how changes in 
“substantive law” influence policy objectives traditionally associated 
with evidence law—“evidentiary policies.” 
To fill this gap, this Article discusses three related evidentiary 
policies. The first is accuracy, which courts and scholars consider a 
central objective of evidence law. But improving the accuracy of legal 
fact-finding is not an exclusive function of evidence law. Different 
substantive rules and doctrines also influence the accuracy of legal 
decisions. Albeit valuable, accuracy is neither free nor cheap. A second 
important consideration in evidence law is the cost of litigation—and the 
cost of fact-finding in particular. Substantive law also plays a role in 
determining the expense of adjudication. Since we cannot eliminate errors 
from an adjudicative system with limited resources, we must decide which 
errors we are willing to accept and which are worthy of spending more 
resources to avoid. The third example of evidentiary policy affected by 
substantive law, and the one this Article focuses on, is allocating the risk 
of mistaken judgments of fact between parties. 
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Standards of proof stand out as a particularly important evidentiary 
mechanism to distribute the risk of errors. The final error distribution, 
however, is also a function of other factors, such as the accuracy of the 
legal fact-finding and how rules are designed and applied. Substantive 
rules can alter the error distribution in a myriad of ways. Through graphs 
and other analytical tools, this Article develops a framework to identify 
and assess these impacts on various situations, including racial 
disparities between Black and White defendants. 
The effects of substantive law on allocating error risk between 
parties raise important concerns for different doctrines, particularly for 
procedural due process. Courts have consistently held that procedural 
due process requires an error-distribution strongly biased in favor of 
criminal defendants. This requirement is primarily enforced through 
standards of proof and other evidentiary rules. However, this Article 
argues that substantive law changes can move us away from an error-
distribution strongly biased in favor of criminal defendants. Scholars and 
practitioners often fail to consider these effects when discussing changes 
to existing laws. This omission comes at a potentially high cost for 
defendants’ procedural due process and other constitutional safeguards, 
especially for minority groups. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Evidence determines winners and losers in a lawsuit. But the impact of 
evidence, and the body of rules governing it, are not limited to the outcome of cases. 
Evidence can affect how (or whether) laws are enforced and policies promoted. For 
instance, evidentiary rules can alter individuals’ incentives outside the courtroom by 
partially determining the expected outcomes of potential lawsuits. Evidence can also 
affect the distribution of legal entitlements in society. Policymakers seeking to alter 
wealth or income distribution across or within different social groups can use 
evidentiary devices to do so.  
Much of this is known to legal scholars.1 The relevant literature, however, has 
not paid enough attention to the inverse relationship between substantive and 
evidence law.2 That is, they have not focused sufficiently on the different ways 
 
1 See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence 
on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 528 (2010) (describing how individuals have 
an incentive to gather and preserve evidence even when socially wasteful); Robert E. Scott 
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 825–
34 (2006) (explaining how evidentiary considerations influence contracts even in the absence 
of active litigation); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (2001) (defending the general ban on character evidence based on 
the potential effect that admitting the evidence could have on incentivizing criminal acts). 
2 Noteworthy exceptions include: Dale A. Nance, Choice of Law for Burdens of Proof, 
46 N.C. J. INT’L L. 235 (2021); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive 
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“substantive law” affects policies traditionally associated with evidence law—
“evidentiary policies.”3 This omission comes with potentially high social costs for 
defendants’ procedural due process safeguards, particularly for members of minority 
groups. This Article fills this gap by developing an analytical framework to assess 
how changes in “substantive law” influence evidentiary policies.  
The Article focuses on three related evidentiary policies. The first is accuracy, 
which courts and scholars consider a central objective of evidence law.4 Improving 
the accuracy of legal fact-finding is not an exclusive function of evidence law; 
different substantive rules and doctrines also influence the accuracy of legal 
decisions. Consider, for instance, the criminalization of perjury.5 Individuals willing 
to come forward and testify under oath have an incentive to tell the truth because 
they will likely face a sanction if they fail to do so. The expected result is an increase 
in truthful testimony—and a corresponding increase in accuracy—in legal 
proceedings.6 
Albeit valuable, accuracy is neither free nor cheap. The cost of litigation—and 
fact-finding, in particular—is also an important consideration in evidence and 
 
Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2010); Bruce L. Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption 
Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1977); Albert Kocourek, Substance and Procedure, 10 
FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1941). 
3 The foregoing discussion is not intended to necessarily refute the prevailing post-
realist rejection of a sharp substance-procedure distinction. This Article uses the broad 
categories of “substantive” and “procedural” primarily as analytical devices. Evidentiary 
considerations are already widely discussed in connection with rules traditionally associated 
with “procedural law.” Not so much for rules traditionally associated with “substantive law.”  
4 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer 
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and . . . promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just 
determination.”) (emphasis added); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“[W]e 
must be mindful [in assessing the interests of the individual and the state] that the function 
of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”); Tehan v. United States, 
382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth . . . .”); 
Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and the NAS Report on Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 367, 372 (2010) (“Theoretical accounts in the law of evidence . . . aim to either justify 
or to reform evidentiary rules or practices in light of their tendencies to produce true 
(factually accurate) outcomes or produce false (factually erroneous) outcomes.”); Richard A. 
Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1199 
(2007) (“Scholars and policymakers thus overwhelmingly view evidentiary rules in criminal 
law as geared primarily toward accuracy in fact-finding.”); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and 
the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 194 (2003) (“Evidence, or the 
rules regulating evidence, may be said to be more or less veritistic, more or less conducive 
to accurate verdicts.”); Jeffrey Bellin, The Evidence Rules that Convict the Innocent, 106 
CORNELL L. REV. 305, 315 (2021) (“The primary end sought through the evidence rules and 
accompanying trial process is factual accuracy.”). 
5 See infra Section III.A.  
6 See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994) (“False testimony in 
a formal proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a ‘flagrant 
affront’ to the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings.”). 
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procedural law.7 Substantive law also plays a role in determining the expense of 
adjudication. Copyright law presents two interesting and surprising examples of 
substantive rules with important effects on litigation costs.8 For instance, the 
eligibility requirements for copyright protection that an author’s work be creative 
and fixed in any tangible medium of expression gain special significance when 
viewed as mechanisms to reduce litigation costs in copyright cases.9  
The prohibitive costs of perfect accuracy mean that we should expect to make 
mistakes. Since we cannot eliminate all errors from an adjudicative system with 
limited resources, we must decide which errors we are willing to accept and which 
are worth spending more resources to avoid. This brings us to another policy goal of 
evidence law: the allocation of the risk of errors between parties.10 Standards of 
proof stand out as an especially important evidentiary mechanism with this 
function.11 For instance, a preponderance of the evidence standard is meant to share 
the risk of error between litigants in (almost) equal fashion. Accordingly, it is often 
used in cases, such as private monetary disputes, where the dominant belief is that 
we should be less concerned about how errors are distributed between parties.12 On 
the other hand, in criminal cases, where defendants’ life and liberty are at stake, we 
 
7 FED. R. EVID. 102 recognizes this when it states, in relevant part, that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence “should be construed so as to . . . eliminate unjustifiable expense and 
delay . . . .” Likewise, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also give voice to that concern 
in FED. R. CIV. P. 1, which states, “These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings . . . [and] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the 
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.” 
8 See infra Part III.B. 
9 Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687–88 
(2003). 
10 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, 13 LAW, PROB. & RISK 195, 206 (2014); 
ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 3–4 (2005); see generally LARRY LAUDAN, 
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY (Gerald Postema 
ed., 2006) (discussing error in the law and the distribution of error in relation to rules of 
evidence and procedure). 
11 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (“In any given proceeding, the 
minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects . . . a societal 
judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.”); 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“The standard serves to allocate the risk of 
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
decision.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369–70 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
choice of the standard for a particular variety of adjudication does, I think, reflect a very 
fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual 
determinations.”). For an in-depth discussion of the error-distribution function of standards 
of proof, see generally Gustavo Ribeiro, The Case for Varying Standards of Proof, 56 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 161 (2019).  
12 Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (“Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome 
of [monetary disputes between private parties,] plaintiff’s burden of proof is a mere 
preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal 
fashion.”). 
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resort to a beyond reasonable doubt standard, which is meant to reduce the likelihood 
of an erroneous judgment against defendants.13  
The final error distribution is also a function of other factors, such as legal fact-
finding accuracy and how rules are designed and applied. Substantive rules can alter 
the error-distribution by changing these factors in a myriad of ways.14 This Article 
develops an analytical framework to identify and assess these impacts in a variety 
of situations.15 For instance, it shows how legal reforms in “substantive law” that 
decrease legal fact-finding accuracy might also result in a corresponding error 
distribution that is less protective of defendants.  
The Article also discusses the disparate racial impacts that reforms in 
“substantive law” can have on Black and White defendants.16 The Article uncovers 
another form of racial disparity in our legal system seldom discussed by legal 
scholarship: because the appearance of guilt is unevenly distributed across races, 
White defendants are often afforded a more protective error distribution than Black 
defendants. For instance, the Article shows that legal reforms that decrease accuracy 
can lead to an error distribution that is less protective of Black defendants but more 
protective of White defendants. The effects of substantive law on allocating error 
risk between parties raise important concerns for different doctrines, including 
procedural due process. The Supreme Court has consistently held that due process 
requires an error distribution strongly biased in favor of criminal defendants.17 
However, as this Article shows, even small legal changes can move away from that 
requirement. Scholars and practitioners often fail to consider these effects when 
discussing changes to existing “substantive” laws. This omission comes at a 
potentially high cost for defendants’ procedural due process and other constitutional 
safeguards, especially for minority groups. 
 
13 Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the 
American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the 
presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose 
‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’”) (quoting 
Coffin v. United States, 165 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). 
14 See infra Sections III.C.1, 2. 
15 The framework in the Article admittedly is not meant as a full picture of our 
adjudicatory institutions. Most noticeably, it does not fully capture the role of implicit and 
explicit biases and prejudices against different social groups that permeate our legal system 
in general, and the criminal justice system in particular. Also not part of the analysis is the 
impact of plea bargaining and settlements in litigation, although they are recognizably large. 
These are all important topics for a full picture of our legal system. However, this Article, 
by design, focuses on a narrower set of variables to attempt to isolate specific effects. 
16 See infra Sections III.C.2, 3. 
17 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”); Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (“Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless 
the Government has borne the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the 
factfinder of his guilt.”). 
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This Article proceeds in two parts. Part II examines ways to pursue policies 
traditionally associated with substantive law using tools from the evidence toolbox. 
It focuses on how evidence rules and doctrines can alter incentives outside the 
courtroom and the distribution of entitlements in our society. Part III presents the 
flip side of the same coin, addressing specific ways substantive law can affect 
evidentiary policies, including improving accuracy in legal fact-finding, reducing 
litigation costs, and distributing the risk of error between parties. Special attention 
is paid to the allocation of the risk of error between parties and racial disparities 
between Black and White defendants.  
 
II.  PURSUING SUBSTANTIVE POLICIES THROUGH EVIDENTIARY RULES 
 
Evidence law can affect how (or whether) different substantive laws are 
enforced and how their underlying policies are promoted.18 Existing research has 
explored these effects in connection with expert evidence,19 discovery,20 pleadings,21 
 
18 Main, supra note 2; E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of 
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 325 (1986) (“[P]rocedure and substance cannot be 
divorced: no procedural decision can be completely ‘neutral’ in the sense that it does not 
affect substance.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 196–
202 (2004).  
19 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the 
Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the 
Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 
1 (2000); David S. Caudill & Donald E. Curley, Strategic Idealizations of Science to Oppose 
Environmental Regulation: A Case Study of Five TMDL Controversies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 
251 (2009).  
20 See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable 
Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011); Martin H. Redish & 
Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A 
Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26 (2008); Robert G. Bone, Who 
Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2007); 
Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform 
Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1167 (2005). 
21 See, e.g., Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 1; Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A 
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, After 
Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading 
Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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summary judgment,22 and class actions.23 This Part discusses two policy 
considerations traditionally associated with substantive law that we can also pursue 
using evidentiary rules: primary behavior and the distribution of legal entitlements. 
 
A.  Changing Primary Incentives 
 
Evidentiary rules are important in determining the expected payoffs associated 
with available courses of action. Rational individuals behave based on a perceived 
incentive structure. These incentives are a function, in part, of the expected value of 
liability determinations (i.e., the probability-weighted average of damage awards for 
which one may be liable to potential plaintiffs).24 
Evidentiary rules affect the expected value of liability determinations in 
different ways. For example, individuals have an incentive to generate, gather, and 
preserve evidence in their favor.25 A potential wrongdoer in an automobile accident 
might conclude she is better off exercising care in a way that allows her to gather 
exculpatory evidence and prevent a potential victim from obtaining inculpatory 
evidence in a socially cost-effective way.26 She might slow down, brake, signal, or 
honk to get the attention of the potential victim or bystanders who could testify in 
her favor. If cameras captured her movements, she could offer the recordings in 
litigation. Additionally, she might refrain from drinking before driving, in part, 
because it might offer strong inculpatory evidence to a potential victim. By using 
safety mechanisms and refraining from engaging in risky conduct, the potential 
 
22 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of 
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 66 (2008); Arthur 
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” 
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 982 (2003). 
23 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-
Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203 (2012); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the 
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924 (2006); 
Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection 
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003); Robert G. Bone & 
David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002). 
24 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1483 (1999).  
25 Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 522. For other seminal discussions of 
evidence-production costs as a proxy for the adequacy of the producer’s primary behavior, 
see Chris W. Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of Interested—and Potentially 
Dishonest—Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320 (2001); Chris W. Sanchirico, Games, 
Information, and Evidence Production: with Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 342 (2000); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An 
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994). 
26 For a contrary intuition, see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 1, at 528 (suggesting 
that a potential victim might decide she is better off allowing accidents than avoiding a 
collision because it might then be easier for her to prove that the other party was at fault). 
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wrongdoer increases her chances of prevailing in case of a dispute arising out of an 
accident.  
The incentive to gather favorable evidence is widespread, but not always 
socially desirable. In medical settings, the need to produce evidence in anticipation 
of a malpractice suit might incentivize doctors to request additional exams, require 
unnecessary hospitalizations, make redundant referrals, or prescribe unneeded 
medications.27 In the criminal world, police officers might have an incentive to allow 
individuals to endanger, or even harm, individuals or property to obtain better 
inculpatory evidence.28 In other words, rational individuals might decide to act in an 
“evidentiarily advantageous” way even when doing so is socially wasteful.29 By 
exploring the potential effect of evidentiary law on primary behavior, policymakers 
can modify evidentiary rules to achieve specific policy objectives such as increasing 
deterrence of harmful activities or reducing the chilling effects of benign activities.30 
 
B.  Redistributing Legal Entitlements 
 
We can also use evidence rules to pursue the “substantive” policy of 
redistributing legal entitlements.31 Any argument about the social benefits of legal 
 
27 David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, William M. Sage, Catherine M. DesRoches, 
Jordan Peugh, Kinga Zapert & Troyen A. Brennan, Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk 
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612 (2005) 
(classifying that type of strategy as “assurance behavior”); see also James Gibson, Doctrinal 
Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1663–64 (2008).  
28 Cf. People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888, 889 (N.Y. 1927) (police allowed individuals to 
approach and rob victims to produce evidence against them). See also State v. Duke, 709 So. 
2d 580, 581–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an alleged child molester was 
arrested too early to qualify as an attempter); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 703 
(Mass. 1990) (holding that riding in a car with a loaded gun in an unsuccessful search for the 
intended victim was insufficient to support a conviction for attempted assault and battery); 
People v. Coleman, 86 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Mich. 1957) (holding that “the purchase of a 
hunting rifle, secretly intended for the murder of the neighbor” is “merely an act of 
[noncriminal] preparation”). 
29 One way to mitigate this perverse incentive is through doctrines such as comparative 
negligence and duty to mitigate. But these options also carry problems as they dilute 
deterrence incentives on potential wrongdoers as they would no longer be fully liable for the 
harm they produce. Also, enforcement might be costly as courts might have to engage with 
elaborate counterfactuals. 
30 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 738 (2012) [hereinafter 
Kaplow, Burden of Proof] (highlighting a tradeoff between the benefits of deterrence and the 
costs of chilling beneficial conduct that go into setting burdens of proof in adjudication to 
maximize social welfare). 
31 Distributive analyses are almost always controversial. Perhaps for that reason, 
distributive considerations are often dealt with indirectly, such as under the guise of formal 
legal equality or equality of bargaining power. Noteworthy exceptions include Daniel 
Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2293 (2003) 
(developing a new account of egalitarianism based on a new conception of 
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changes depends on specific assumptions about the distribution of legal 
entitlements.32 By manipulating entitlements, we can significantly influence (or 
potentially dominate) the cost-benefit analysis of any legal change.33  
Evidence rules are a part of individuals’ legal entitlements with relevant 
consequences to the societal distribution of wealth and income.34 It follows that 
anyone interested in altering the distribution of wealth or income among different 
social groups can also use rules of evidence and procedure to reach redistributive 
objectives. For instance, there are historical examples of changes in “mere” 
evidentiary and other procedural rules that have weakened civil rights.35 Recent 
 
nonsubordination); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28–38 
(2002) (providing an in-depth criticism of the role of distributive considerations in the 
assessment of legal policies); Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 599, 617–18 (2000) (considering distribution implications of rights and benefits 
awarded to people with disabilities); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 307–19 (2000) 
(concerning health care policy); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 245 (1999) (concerning administrative practice); 
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 
322 (1994) (asserting that the common thread within estate tax concerns distribution); 
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 387, 433–38, 444 (1981) (outlining the interplay between the distribution of wealth and 
policy makers’ decisions in creating private law rules); see generally Duncan Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (arguing 
that distributive and paternalist motives play a central role in explaining contract and tort 
rules with respect to agreements).  
32 The notion of a “legal entitlement” is a broad one, encompassing different forms of 
“rights,” such as the right to one’s bank deposits, the right to a clean atmosphere, the right 
of free assembly, or the right to drive others out of business by free competition, etc. See 
generally Ian Ayres & J. M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996) (discussing different ways that 
policymakers can protect legal entitlements); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972) (distinguishing between property rules and liability rules as techniques for 
protecting entitlements). Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld provides a seminal classification of 
legal entitlements in his works. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) 
(categorizing different legal entitlements into fundamental elements of legal relations).  
33 The exact impact of any change in the legal entitlements will depend on several 
variables, such as the price and income elasticities of supply and demand curves, the presence 
of externalities, and the competitive structure of that specific market. 
34 See generally Tamar Frankel, Presumptive Reasoning Applied to Legal Doctrine: 
Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and Change, 17 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 759 (1994) (providing a discussion of the centrality of burdens of proof for 
individuals’ entitlements). 
35 See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, 
Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law 
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examples include Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.36 In Wal-Mart, the court 
effectively raised the plaintiffs’ burden to meet the commonality requirement for 
class certification. The court suggested that plaintiffs needed to show evidence that 
the defendant had an explicit policy of gender discrimination or an identifiable 
discriminatory practice, like a testing requirement.37 As a result, discrimination and 
equal pay cases are considerably more challenging to win.38 In other words, workers’ 
legal entitlements are weakened compared to those of large employers. 
Research has also explored the distributive consequences of other procedural 
rules, such as the stricter pleading requirements following the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly39 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.40 For instance, 
dismissals of employment discrimination and civil rights cases have risen 
significantly in the wake of Iqbal, particularly in cases involving individuals as 
plaintiffs as opposed to corporate and governmental entities.41 In employment 
discrimination and civil rights, the information needed to establish the plaintiff’s 
case is often in the defendant’s hands.42 Because these plaintiffs tend to have limited 
 
in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 301 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing 
Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010); see also McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.18 (1973) (creating the so-called disparate 
treatment theory, which requires plaintiffs to prove defendants’ subjective discriminatory 
intent, and not merely the consequences, as was the rule before under Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)); Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (establishing that plaintiffs need proof of discriminatory motive 
in disparate treatment cases). 
36 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
37 Id. at 355–57. 
38 Elizabeth Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the 
Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 771 (2013). 
39 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
40 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009). 
41 See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 
101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) (showing that dismissals of employment discrimination and 
civil rights cases have risen significantly in the wake of Iqbal); Raymond H. Brescia, The 
Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing 
Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011) (reporting that dismissal rates in housing 
and employment discrimination cases increased after Iqbal, but not after Twombly); Patricia 
W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 553 (2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss were four times more likely to be 
granted after Iqbal as they were before, even after controlling for other variables); but see 
generally William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with 
Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013) (Twombly 
precipitated no significant change in dismissal rates). 
42 See, e.g., David A. Green, The Fallacy of Liberal Discovery: Litigating Employment 
Discrimination Cases in the E-Discovery Age, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 721 (2016); Terri L. 
Dill, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Refining the Burdens of Proof in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 48 ARK. L. REV. 617, 617 (1995). 
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resources and limited access to evidence, they are usually less able to put forward 
the necessary factual allegations to survive dismissal.  
Upon reflection, it is no surprise that evidentiary rules can influence 
“substantive” policies. Many substantive rules are partially justified only with 
reference to a particular evidentiary background.43 Take, for instance, the statute of 
frauds requirement in some States that an agreement above a certain value must be 
in writing to be enforceable.44 This requirement makes sense in an evidentiary 
system where we doubt our ability to verify correctly the authenticity of oral 
agreements. In a legal system where evidence of oral agreement is more readily 
available and carries greater weight, we may have no prevailing reason not to 
enforce those agreements. If a change in the evidentiary background provides a good 
reason to modify a substantive rule, then part of the justification for that rule is 
procedural. 
The dependency of substantive rules on evidence goes deeper. All substantive 
law operates within a specific evidentiary apparatus. Imagine an evidentiary system 
with high standards of proof for all types of claims and causes of action. We should 
expect that substantive laws would be enacted considering that evidentiary reality. 
If some of these laws were enforced in a different evidentiary system, with 
significantly lower standards of proof, we would expect these rules to be over-
enforced. Similarly, substantive laws drafted within an evidentiary system with low 
discovery costs would be under-enforced if translated to a system with high 
discovery costs. Substantive laws are not written in an evidentiary vacuum. 
Evidentiary systems, in turn, are not fungible.45 That would be the case only if the 
same set of substantive rules could be equally enforced in any evidentiary system. 
But that is rarely so. 
 
III.  PURSUING EVIDENTIARY POLICIES THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
 
Legal scholarship has not paid enough attention to the different ways 
substantive law affects policies traditionally associated with evidence law—
“evidentiary policies.” To help fill that void, this Part discusses three examples of 
evidentiary policies, namely accuracy, litigation costs, and the distribution of the 
risk of error, and examines how they are shaped by substantive law.  
 
43 See references supra note 2. 
44 D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited: With Some 
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. 
REV. 189, 206 (1982). 
45 Main, supra note 2, at 827; see also Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some 
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718, 737 (1975); Paul D. Carrington, 
Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of 
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2070 (1989); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2247 (1989); Stephen C. Yeazell, The 
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 641–46 
(1994). 
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A.  Improving Accuracy 
 
Accuracy is a central objective of evidence law.46 The Federal Rules of 
Evidence explicitly recognize: “[t]hese rules should be construed . . . to the end of 
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”47 The Supreme Court 
supported this view when it claimed that the “basic purpose of a trial is determining 
truth.”48 This position is also deeply embedded in the history of the field.49 With the 
goal of improving accuracy in mind, we can better understand the justification 
behind many evidence rules and doctrines.  
Exclusionary rules provide an interesting example. At first, excluding any 
evidence from a trial might seem to interfere with the accuracy of the legal system. 
This apparent contradiction has led many prominent authors to argue against 
withholding non-misleading evidence from fact-finders.50 Yet, in exceptional 
situations, evidence may fatally undermine the pursuit of accuracy. For example, a 
confession made by means of torture or coercion might reduce accuracy as research 
has consistently shown that individuals often confess to crimes they did not commit 
to stop the torture.51 The ban on hearsay is another good illustration. From the fact-
finder’s perspective, it is generally preferable to hear and confront the original 
declarant of an out-of-court statement. However, the parties have an incentive to 
 
46 See sources cited supra note 4. 
47 FED. R. EVID. 102 (emphasis added). 
48 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
49 See William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 MOD. L. REV. 261, 272 (1984) 
(“There is undoubtedly a dominant underlying theory of evidence in adjudication in which 
the central notions are truth, reason and justice under the law. It can be re-stated simply in 
some such terms as these: the primary end of adjudication is rectitude of decision, that is the 
correct application of rules of substantive law to facts that have been proved to an agreed 
standard of truth or probability.”); compare Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An 
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) (arguing against the adversarial process as 
a truth-seeking enterprise) with Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975) (replying that the adversary process is necessary to preserve for 
individual dignity); and H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: 
A Reaction to Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975) (proposing reforms to 
the adversary process to strengthen its truth-seeking goal). 
50 See, e.g., 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY 
APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 302–12, 350–58 (1827); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 265 (1898); JOHN WIGMORE, 
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
414 (1940). For more recent works, see ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL 
WORLD 292–95 (1999); LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 121–22; Susan Haack, Epistemology 
Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 56 (2004); but see 
Frederick Schauer, In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law—and Epistemology Too, 5 
EPISTEME 295, 303 (2008) (“[E]xclusionary rules . . . produce the largest number or higher 
percentage of a good decision and the smallest number or lowest percentage of bad ones.”). 
51 See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15–16 
(1978). 
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present only those statements that advance their case and reduce the chance of a 
damaging cross-examination. Banning hearsay gives parties an incentive to bring 
the declarant into the court.52 
The epistemic function of some exclusionary rules acquires additional meaning 
within the American institutional background.53 In an adversarial system where 
parties control what evidence will be brought to court, we should expect self-
interested parties to present evidence of inferior evidentiary value, even when better 
evidence (from the fact-finder’s standpoint) is available. In this scenario, 
exclusionary rules are a useful instrument in motivating the parties to present the 
best available evidence. Accuracy is also a justification for part of that institutional 
background itself. One widely accepted justification for the adversarial system is 
that the parties’ self-interest provides them with enough incentive to investigate and 
put forward their best case. The trier of fact remains relatively detached from the 
evidence and, presumably, best able to discern the truth.54 
Albeit ubiquitously recognized, the value of more accurate decisions is mostly 
taken for granted. Rarely do we ask why accuracy is desirable in the first place. A 
seemingly straightforward answer is that innocent individuals have a right not to be 
 
52 Not all exclusionary rules have accuracy as their underlying justification. For 
instance, the privilege between spouses, doctor and patient, and attorney and client are 
justified on other grounds. See, e.g., Hock Lai Ho, The Fair Trial Rationale for Excluding 
Wrongfully Obtained Evidence, in DO EXCLUSIONARY RULES ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL? 283 
(Sabine Gless & Thomas Richter eds., 2019) (discussing how trial fairness is undermined by 
allowing reliance on wrongfully obtained evidence); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed 
Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 167 (2006) (“Privileges, for 
example, do not purport to serve epistemic goals.”); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical 
Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 420 (1991) (“Most privilege rules are designed to sacrifice 
truth-seeking to other values, and thus they are indifferent to the comparison of the 
conventional view of the proof rules and the equally well specified cases proposal.”). 
53 See generally MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997) (examining how 
the American legal system affects the way evidence is presented in court); Robert M. Bloom 
& David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in 
Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47 (2010) (summarizing the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning exclusionary rules between its inception and its 
incorporation to the states); Mark S. Brodin, The British Experience with Hearsay Reform: 
A Cautionary Tale, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1417 (2016) (telling a cautionary tale of the 
negative consequences that followed when the U.K. relaxed its requirements of cross-
examination). 
54 See Mirjan Damaška, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1975); DAMAŠKA, supra note 53, at 74–79. The argument has a 
similar structure to Mill’s argument for freedom of speech in JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY (1859). But see generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. 
REV. 227 (1988) (arguing that a best evidence principle in the adversary system does not 
guarantee that the best reasonably available evidence on an issue will be introduced by the 
parties). 
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mistakenly convicted of crimes or found liable for damages.55 Less obviously, 
perhaps, accuracy is also valuable to improve individuals’ incentives to behave 
appropriately by increasing deterrence and decreasing chilling costs.56  
Accuracy is not only a goal, nor solely a function of, evidentiary laws. 
Substantive law also influences the accuracy of legal fact-finding. We can better 
explain and understand different rules and doctrines traditionally associated with 
substantive law as also having the purpose, or at least the effect, of increasing the 
accuracy of the legal system. One example is perjury.57 Because most cases rely 
upon sworn testimony, our court system’s integrity depends in large part on the 
truthfulness of statements made under oath.58 Once lying under oath is criminalized, 
individuals willing to come forward and testify under oath have an incentive to tell 
the truth because if they fail to do so, they will likely face a sanction. The expected 
result is an increase in truthful testimony and a corresponding increase in accuracy 
within legal proceedings.  
 
55 This raises the interesting question: if we recognize that people have a right not to be 
convicted of crimes of which they are innocent, does it follow that people have a right to the 
most accurate procedures possible to prove their guilt or innocence, no matter how expensive 
these procedures might be? See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72–73 
(1985) (suggesting “no” as an answer to that question); HO HOCK LAI, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 67–68 (2008) (suggesting the same). 
56 Kaplow, supra note 25, at 309 (“If I contemplate committing an act that is unusually 
harmful, I will be more careful or more likely to refrain from the act if I will be held 
responsible for the true, higher level of harm, rather than for the lower, average level of harm 
for the class of acts.”). Accuracy is particularly important when individuals know the actual 
level of harm of their actions (or know to what extent some other action affects the magnitude 
of the actual harm). If individuals know only the average level of harm associated with the 
acts they are planning to commit, but not the actual harm they will cause, then an adjudicative 
system that is able to identify more accurately the actual harm seems wasteful as that 
information is not available to individuals ex hypothesis, and so cannot influence their 
behavior. At the same time, the level of information individuals have about the level of actual 
harm of their own behavior is not necessarily given. Accuracy can also influence the degree 
to which individuals will decide to spend resources to acquire information about the level of 
harm of their activities. Id. 
57 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621–23. For interesting discussions about perjury, see Gregory Klass, 
Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449, 465 n.63 (2012); 
Bryan H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying: Under What Circumstances, If 
Any, Should Lies Be Made Criminal?, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 546–47 (2011); 
Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the 
Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 174–82 (2001); Richard 
H. Underwood, Perjury: An Anthology, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 329–35 (1996); 
see generally W. A. Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 67 (arguing 
that the courts and the legal profession had been overly lenient toward the crime of perjury) 
(1908). 
58 See ABF Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (“False testimony in a formal 
proceeding is intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a ‘flagrant affront’ to 
the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings.”). 
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A second example of a substantive rule that potentially influences the accuracy 
of legal decisions is the partial defense of provocation in homicide cases. In many 
jurisdictions, a person who kills another as a direct response to a legally adequate 
act of provocation is guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.59 The provocation 
doctrine often has an objective component: it requires that the provocation be an act 
or event capable of destabilizing a person of ordinary temperament.60 The problem 
is that a subjective standard can be more complex and, therefore, require substantial 
fact-finding expenditures and increase the risk of introducing biases and 
prejudices.61 Moreover, since evidence about a person’s subjective state of mind is 
easy to fabricate and difficult to refute, we should expect that defendants in murder 
cases would raise it indiscriminately. Because the necessary evidence to refute such 
a defense would be in possession of the defendants, it would be difficult for fact-
finders to identify cases in which the defense was appropriately used. This can carry 
high costs in terms of accuracy.62 
 
B.  Reducing Litigation Costs 
 
Although valuable, accuracy is not free or cheap.63 Reducing unnecessary 
litigation costs is an important goal of evidentiary and procedural laws.64 Federal 
Rule of Evidence 102 recognizes this by stating that the rules “should be construed 
 
59 Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial 
Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2011).  
60 Id. at 1043. 
61 See STEIN, supra note 10, at 3–4 (“[The objective requirement of the partial defense 
of provocation] advances evidential objectives rather than the goals of substantive criminal 
law, such as deterrence, desert, and retribution.”). 
62 Reasonableness standards are also an element of many tort defenses. James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906–07 (1982) (noting 
that in order for liability rules to support adjudicatory proceedings, “the rules must require 
that the relevant facts are likely to be verifiable by objective evidence, and that the issues for 
decision be arranged so that they may be addressed, considered, and decided in an orderly 
sequence”). For an alternative view of defenses in torts cases, see generally John C.P. 
Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL. L. REV. 467 (explaining how tort law can refuse to 
recognize excuses) (2015). 
63 Estimating the costs of litigation is complex and challenging. The National Center 
for State Courts developed a model that relies on the amount of time expended by attorneys 
in various litigation tasks in a variety of civil cases filed in state courts. Paula Hannaford-
Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 20 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 
1 (2013). For instance, the model estimated that a typical automobile tort case in 2013 
resolved shortly after case initiation costs less than $1,000 at the 25th percentile to $7,350 at 
the 75th percentile per side for attorney fees. Id. at 5. If the case settles after discovery is 
complete, the costs increase from $5,000 to $36,000 in attorney fees. Id. If the case goes to 
trial, the total costs, including expert witness fees, can range from $18,000 to $109,000 per 
side. Id. These numbers show how litigation costs might affect a litigant’s access to the civil 
justice system. 
64 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 24, at 1484; Kaplow, supra note 25, at 307–08.  
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so as to . . . eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay . . . .”65 Consider the parol 
evidence rule, according to which an oral testimony contrary to a written, fully-
integrated contract is generally inadmissible.66 At first, one might assume the 
evidentiary purpose of this rule is to increase accuracy. This would only make sense, 
however, if we expected that most witnesses testifying against written agreements 
are lying, an empirically questionable assumption. The parol evidence rule is better 
understood as an attempt to contain litigation costs. Inducing contracting parties to 
better document their agreements makes the court’s task less demanding if a dispute 
arises. 
Litigation costs are not only a function of evidentiary laws, however. 
Substantive law also influences the cost of our adjudicatory system. Copyright law 
presents two interesting and surprising examples of substantive rules with important 
effects on litigation costs.67 Consider, for instance, the creativity requirement, also 
referred to as the originality requirement.68 To be eligible for copyright protection, 
“a work must be original to the author,” which means that the work must possess “at 
least some minimal degree of creativity.”69 Examples of works that lack creativity 
and thus have been denied protection include phonebooks70 and recipe books.71 One 
explanation proposed for why an intellectual property regime would deny protection 
to uncreative work is that creativity correlates with value, so uncreative works would 
not be sufficiently valuable to merit protection.72 But this explanation is not entirely 
satisfactory. Many uncreative works, such as phonebooks, are arguably valuable. 
Moreover, having value is not a requirement for copyright. Market forces ultimately 
determine a work’s value. A work might have zero market value but still be entitled 
to copyright protection.  
 
65 FED. R. EVID. 102. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also voice that concern. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 establishes that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings . . . [and] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the 
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.” 
66 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202. (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
67 See generally Lichtman, supra note 9 (discussing, in part, copyright doctrines and 
the idea that social costs of litigation outweigh the social benefits of offering copyright 
protection). 
68 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship . . . .”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (a work of authorship must possess “some minimal degree of 
creativity” to sustain a copyright claim). 
69 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362. 
70 See id. at 362 (holding that white pages are not entitled to copyright as they are 
“devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity”). 
71 See Publ’ns Int’l., Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that recipes do not merit copyright protection because they “do not contain even 
a bare modicum of” creativity). 
72 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45–46 (1967); MARSHALL 
A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (5th ed. 2010). 
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An alternative explanation, among possible others, for why our legal system 
requires works to be creative to receive copyright protection is that uncreative works 
introduce serious evidentiary problems.73 Infringement disputes would be costly if 
uncreative works were copyrightable.74 In a case between parties with similar 
uncreative works, it would be difficult to determine whether one party copied the 
other, or both copied a third party, or whether similarities between their works are 
due simply to the lack of a creative element. Suppose A copyrights work X, and the 
copyright expires in 2025. In 2026, A copyrights work Y, which is virtually 
indistinguishable from X. In 2030, B creates work Z, which is indistinguishable from 
both X and Y. If A sues B, claiming that B infringed A’s copyright on Y, and B 
replies that he was copying X (on which copyright had expired) rather than Y, how 
could a fact-finder decide which was true?75 Or imagine we instructed several people 
to create a list of all Indian restaurants in Boston.76 They would likely create 
essentially the same list, even without copying from each other. A creativity 
requirement prevents highly costly cases from entering (or at least progressing in) 
our administrative and court systems. 
Likewise, the copyright requirement that a work must be fixed in any “tangible 
medium of expression,”77 such as a manuscript, video, or computer file, can also be, 
at least partially, explained by its effects on litigation costs. The relevant statute 
defines eligible forms of fixation as “any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”78 
The medium does not need to be completely permanent. It needs only to be 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”79 Works that 
may not satisfy the fixation requirement include any improvisational speech, sketch, 
dance, or other performance that is not recorded in a tangible medium of 
expression.80 One plausible explanation for this requirement is that an “unfixed 
work” would create serious proof problems, substantially increasing the costs of 
copyright ligation.81 A fixation requirement excludes cases where there never was 
 
73 Lichtman, supra note 9, at 704–05. 
74 Id. at 705; Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics 
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 69–70 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, Intellectual Property] 
(making the same point in connection with the requirement that derivative works have some 
incremental originality). 
75 Posner, Intellectual Property, supra note 74, at 69–70. 
76 Lichtman, supra note 9, at 705. 
77 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
78 Id.  
79 Id. § 101 (defining “fixed”). 
80 Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 1442, 1455–56 (1986). 
81 Lichtman, supra note 9, at 730; see also Russ VerSteeg, Jurimetric Copyright: Future 
Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 132 (1994) (“One of the most 
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any physical evidence of the claimed expression.82 Without a fixation requirement, 
expressions and ideas would be virtually indistinguishable.  
 
C.  Affecting the Distribution of Errors 
 
The prohibitive costs of a legal system with perfect accuracy mean that we 
should expect to make factual adjudication errors. As we cannot eliminate all errors, 
we must decide which ones we are willing to accept and which we consider worth 
spending additional resources to avoid. This brings us to the focus of this Article and 
the third example of an evidentiary policy goal: the distribution of the risk of factual 
errors between plaintiffs or prosecutors and defendants. 
 
1.  The Error-Distribution Function of Standards of Proof 
 
Standards of proof stand out as a particularly important evidentiary device that 
embodies social decisions about the optimal error distribution.83 One way to 
visualize the error-distribution function of standards of proof is with graphs like 
Figure 1, depicted below.84 But first, a caveat. This framework is admittedly not 
meant to reflect a complete picture of any legal system. Instead, the abstract 





important reasons for requiring fixation . . . as a condition precedent to copyright protection 
is to ensure that a copyright claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence  
. . . .”); Gregory S. Donat, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for Improvisational 
Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1367–75 (1997). 
82 The fixation requirement does not exclude cases where evidence existed at some 
point but it is not available at litigation. Lichtman, supra note 9, at 732–33.  
83 See sources cited supra note 11; see also LAUDAN, supra note 10, ch. 2, 3; STEIN, 
supra note 10, at 138 (“[E]vidential rules and principles affiliating to [the U.S.] have a single 
all-important function: allocation of the risk of error.”); MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN, 
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 62–69 (1978); Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court: 
1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 158 n.13 (1970) (“[T]he reasonable doubt standard seeks to 
assure that erroneous acquittals of the guilty will be far more common than the erroneous 
convictions of the innocent.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1380–81 n.162 (1971) (“[A] demanding 
burden of proof is imposed on the prosecution in order to assure that men are wrongly 
convicted much less often than they are wrongly acquitted.”). For an in-depth discussion of 
objections to this account of standards of proof, see generally Ribeiro, supra note 11. 
84 For other works using similar graphs to represent the error-distribution function of 
standards of proof, see LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 67–69; Allen, supra note 10, at 204–06; 
Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s 
Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 570–74 (1987); 
Michael L. Dekay, The Difference Between Blackstone‐Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic 
Standards of Proof, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95, 101 (1996). 
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from this initial picture are traces of racial and other forms of prejudice against 
minorities that shape much of the American legal system. Part II.C.iii below 
mitigates this issue by incorporating certain racial disparities that permeate the 




The x-axis (horizontal axis) represents a range of the apparent likelihood of 
guilt fact-finders (judges or jurors) assigned to cases. At one end, we have cases with 
very weak evidence. These cases might involve acts done by a single individual in 
private settings with few externalities and low probability of detection. At the other 
end are cases with very strong evidence against defendants, such as acts committed 
in public settings with a high number of witnesses, externalities, and detection rates. 
Along the y-axis (vertical axis) is the relative frequency of cases for each level of 
apparent guilt.  
Two distributions are key here: “truly innocent” and “truly guilty” defendants.86 
Absent a highly dysfunctional legal system, we should expect that truly guilty 
defendants will, on average, have higher apparent guilt than truly innocent 
defendants. Consequently, the distribution of truly guilty defendants is represented 
 
85 See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
86 Some might object to the use of the terms “guilty” and “innocent.” Under one view, 
“guilty” and “innocent” represent labels that are only appropriately used at the end of a legal 
process. See, e.g., Zenon Bankowski, The Value of Truth: Fact Scepticism Revisited, 1 
LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1981). The terms “guilty” and “innocent” are employed in the 
relevant literature to refer to individuals who committed the violations they are being accused 
of and those who did not, respectively. See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 10 (examining the 
rules of evidence and procedure in relation to truth). This Article kept those terms to avoid 
confusion for readers familiar with the relevant literature. One could easily change the names 
of both curves without harm to the conclusions that follow.  
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to the right of the truly innocent distribution on the horizontal spectrum.87 Although 
both distributions are depicted as normal curves, normality is not an essential feature 
of this analysis. Other unimodal distributions can yield similar results.88 Note also 
that both distributions are represented as overlapping. This overlap exists because 
there is significant variability within each distribution in terms of apparent guilt.89 
Some truly innocent defendants have higher apparent guilt than some truly guilty 
defendants. 
We can represent a standard of proof by drawing a line perpendicular to the 
horizontal axis. That line marks how strongly the admitted evidence supporting a 
conclusion about liability must be to justify a finding of liability. More specifically, 
this line shows how strongly the admitted evidence supporting the party carrying the 




The visual appeal of this mode of representation is that the areas under the 
curves represent the probabilities of each possible outcome. The area under the Truly 
Guilty curve to the right of the standard line represents the probability that a truly 
guilty individual will be convicted. The area under the Truly Guilty curve to the left 
of the standard (the small blue area in Figure 2) indicates the probability of a truly 
guilty individual being mistakenly acquitted (also referred to as a “Type II Error” or 
a false negative). Conversely, the probability that a truly innocent individual is 
mistakenly convicted is given by the larger red area under the Truly Innocent curve 
 
87 DeKay, supra note 84, at 102. 
88 The two distributions can also be understood as conditional distributions reflecting 
the likely values of apparent guilt given that the defendant is truly innocent or given that the 
defendant is truly guilty. Id. at 102–03. 
89 Id.  
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to the right of the standard line (also referred to as a “Type I Error” or a false 
positive). For values to the left of that point, the individual is correctly acquitted. 
Presumably, we want to reduce the likelihood that a truly innocent individual 
is mistakenly found liable. Holding other features of the legal system constant (e.g., 
the level of enforcement and the mean and standard deviation of each distribution), 
we can try to achieve that goal by increasing the minimal level of evidential support 
required for a liability determination. That is, we can increase the standard of proof 
necessary for conviction. Graphically, this means moving the perpendicular line in 




The area under the Truly Innocent curve to the right of the standard line (red 
area) is smaller, which means a reduced probability of truly innocent defendants 
being mistakenly found liable. However, this also reduces the likelihood of correctly 
assigning liability for a truly guilty individual. In other words, when determining the 
optimal standard, decisionmakers will trade off the number of false positives for 
false negatives.90 This trade-off is partially the result of a significant variability 
within each group. Some truly innocent defendants may appear guiltier than some 
truly guilty defendants (visually represented by the overlap of the two curves). The 
higher the likelihood we will correctly assign liability to truly guilty individuals, the 
higher the likelihood we will mistakenly assign liability to truly innocent 
individuals. On the flip side, lowering the standard of proof (moving the line in 
 
90 This conclusion does not take into consideration an expected level of endogeneity. 
That is, the number of innocents and guilty individuals that go to trial seems to be a function 
of, among other things, the level of the standard of proof itself. With a higher standard of 
proof, conviction becomes more difficult, which lowers the expected costs of sanction for 
individuals.  
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Figure 2 or 3 to the left) increases the likelihood that fact-finders will correctly 
convict truly guilty individuals while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that 
truly innocent individuals will mistakenly be found liable. Either way, there is a 
trade-off. 
Suppose we value one type of error over the other. Why not set up the standard 
at the highest level possible to eliminate virtually the chances of convicting an 
innocent person? The main problem with this proposal is that it ignores the fact that 
both types of errors have costs.91 If the standard is too high, we make it nearly 
impossible to convict the truly innocent, but we risk doing the same for the truly 
guilty. That has nontrivial consequences, which include losses in deterrence. A 
reduction in deterrence can potentially cause crime rates to increase. Moreover, a 
loss in deterrence leads to less confidence that justice has been served since a wrong 
committed is not remedied, and less trust in the legal system since victims are denied 
retribution. The “optimal” error distribution is a function of how society values the 
relative costs and benefits of both accurate and erroneous convictions and 
acquittals.92 
Some scholars, however, are skeptical about our capacity to pursue the 
evidentiary policy of successfully distributing the risk of error between parties.93 
These authors usually offer two considerations to support their skepticism. First, 
they point to the extreme difficulty and the potentially high administrative costs of 
acquiring reliable empirical information about all the different factors that affect the 
final distribution of the risk of factual error between parties.94 Second, they note our 
 
91 See LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIALS AND ERRORS? 88–105 
(2016); see generally Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 65 (2008) (articulating the costs of mistakes other than the conviction of an innocent 
person); Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 23 (2010) (discussing costs in the context of bail practices and policies); 
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive 
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2011) (discussing costs and trade-offs in 
the context of preventative detention). 
92 See, e.g., Dekay, supra note 84, at 99; Tribe, supra note 83, at 1389–93; see generally 
Ronald J. Allen, How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their Allocation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
885 (2012) (discussing societal cost valuation in regard to broader litigation behavior). 
93 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. 
REV. 1047, 1063–64 (2011) [hereinafter Allen, Taming of Complexity]; see generally KEVIN 
M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL BASES 
FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD (2013) (cataloging the variety of 
decisionmaking standards that exist in the law); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, 
Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013) (noticing that Stein makes 
this a central element of evidence law in STEIN, supra note 10, particularly in chapters 5 and 
6).  
94 Allen, supra note 10, at 210–12 (arguing that an analysis focused on error-
distribution depends on several empirical variables regarding the size and shape of the 
curves); Allen & Stein, supra note 93, at 582 (noting that certain proposals “require[] 
policymakers to articulate all these categories, along with all other forms of human activity, 
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limited capacity to correctly predict the final distribution equilibrium resulting from 
the different dynamic effects.95 For those objectors, the problems of insufficient data 
and unpredictable effects justify a deep skepticism about our capacity to affect the 
error distribution. 
Elsewhere, I have offered one possible reply to this line of objection.96 There, 
I argued that standards of proof are better understood as prescriptive generalizations, 
just like other legal rules.97 Here, this Article only points out that the academic 
debunking involved in those objections affects virtually all types of policy analysis 
to the same degree. Ultimately, it is premature to dismiss recommendations simply 
for lack of “sufficient data.” Surely, any model becomes increasingly dangerous as 
it ignores existing data. Absent suitable substitutes, however, models that include 
currently unverified (but verifiable) assumptions are helpful starting points. 
Most importantly, these starting points need not be spurious assumptions. We 
can build them on top of plausible intuitions about a range of empirical phenomena, 
including the expected distribution of truly guilty and truly innocent people and the 
number of members of each group that goes to trial for a given set of acts. These 
intuitions can provide us with prima facie epistemic justification for believing in 
those starting points.98 However, we should not remain uncritical. We can (and 
should) always periodically pause to re-evaluate our beliefs and practices. If we 
notice a significant deviation between our reality and our ambitions, we should make 
the appropriate adjustments and move forward. It makes little sense to resort to other 
models because they are easier to employ if those substitutes have virtually no 
relationship to our objectives. The alternative is unacceptable paralysis. 
The influence of standards of proof on the error distribution should not be 
overstated, however. Standards of proof, and evidence law more generally, are not 
the only forces at play in determining the error distribution. 
 
2.  How Substantive Law Affects the Error Distribution 
 
Substantive law can affect the distribution of error between plaintiffs or 




and gather dependable information about the mix of harms and benefits associated with each 
category”); see also CLERMONT, supra note 93, at 264–68; but see Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 
supra note 30, at 772 n.59 (“[T]he information requirements for determination of the optimal 
evidence threshold do not differ greatly from those for the determinants for the 
preponderance rule or other rules based on ex-post likelihoods.”). 
95 Allen, Taming of Complexity, supra note 93, at 1063–66. 
96 Ribeiro, supra note 11, at 207–12.  
97 Id.  
98 See, e.g., LAURENCE BONJOUR, IN DEFENSE OF PURE REASON: A RATIONALIST 
ACCOUNT OF A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION (1998) (defending a rationalist view according to which 
a priori rational insights may be genuine, albeit fallible, sources of epistemic justification and 
knowledge).  
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innocent individuals that go to trial. In other words, substantive law can change how 
the Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty curves look in Figures 1–3 above.99 
As shown above, substantive laws can affect the accuracy of legal fact-
finding.100 A more accurate legal system is better able to distinguish between the 
factually guilty and the factually innocent. Truly Innocent individuals would have 
weaker evidence against them, while Truly Guilty defendants would have stronger 
evidence. One way to represent this increase in accuracy graphically is to lower the 
mean of the Truly Innocent curve and increase the mean of the Truly Guilty curve, 




Moving the Truly Guilty curve to the right corresponds with a decrease in the 
probability of mistaken acquittals. This is represented by the smaller blue striped 
area under the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof line. 
Simultaneously, moving the Truly Innocent curve further to the left causes a 
decrease in the probability of mistaken convictions, as shown by the smaller red 
striped area under the curve to the right of the standard line. This shift in both curves 
changes the corresponding ratio of false acquittals to false convictions (the ratio of 
 
99 See Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of 
Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 47 n.65 
(1977) (“Without knowing the distribution of guilt probabilities of factually innocent and 
guilty defendants, we cannot know the actual effect of choosing one standard of proof over 
another.”). For concrete examples, see FINKELSTEIN, supra note 83 at 62–69. 
100 See supra Section III.A.  
101 Figure 4 changes the x-value of the means of the Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty 
curves while maintaining their y-value and standard deviation. 
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the blue striped area to the red striped area).102 The new error distribution is more 
protective of defendants.103 For every false conviction, there is a higher number of 
false acquittals.  
The opposite is also true. Certain legal reforms might have the perhaps 
unexpected consequence of reducing the accuracy of our legal system. For example, 
some jurisdictions’ drug laws include weight thresholds as a proxy (sometimes 
referred to as “indicia of sale”) for police and prosecutors to decide who is a drug 
user and who is a dealer.104 If an individual is caught with an amount of a certain 
 
102 Scholars and practitioners alike focus almost exclusively on the ratio between false 
acquittals to false convictions (the so-called “Blackstone ratio,” in memory of the influential 
British legal theorist who advocated this idea), even though other ratio options are also 
possible. LAUDAN, supra note 10, at 68–75 (pointing to problems with this ratio and arguing 
in favor of a ratio of true acquittals to false convictions instead); but see Zoë Johnson King, 
The Trouble with Standards of Proof (Apr. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (arguing that any ratio is problematic). 
103 One way to verify this result is to calculate the approximate probabilities of the 
relevant situations (i.e., the color regions) in Figure 4 under certain assumptions. Suppose 
the original Truly Innocent curve represents a standard normal distribution with a standard 
deviation of one. The Truly Guilty curve has the same standard deviation as the Truly 
Innocent curve but a higher mean. Suppose now that the line marking the standard of proof 
is two standards deviations from the mean of the Truly Innocent curve and one standard 
deviation from the mean of the Truly Guilty curve. The probability of wrong convictions 
(WC), the red region in Figure 4, is the area under the Truly Innocent curve greater than two 
standards deviations from the mean, or 0.0228. The probability of wrong acquittals (WA), 
the blue region in Figure 4, is the area under the Truly Guilty curve that is less than one 
standard deviation from the mean, or 0.1587. In this scenario, the ratio of the probabilities of 
wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA/WC) is, thus, approximately 7. Suppose now 
that changes in substantive law caused the Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty curves in Figure 
4 to move one standard deviation to the left and the right, respectively. The new probability 
of wrong convictions (WC’), the red stripped region in Figure 4, is the area under the Truly 
Innocent curve that is greater than 3 standards deviations from the mean, or 0.0013. The new 
probability of wrong acquittals (WA’), the blue striped region in Figure 4, is the area under 
the Truly Guilty curve that is less than two standard deviations from the mean, or 0.0228. In 
this scenario, the ratio of the new probabilities of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions 
(WA’/WC’) is, thus, approximately 17.5. That is, the new ratio of wrong acquittals to wrong 
convictions (WA’/WC’) is higher than the old ratio (WA/WC). As explained in the main 
text, a higher ratio represents an error-distribution that is more protective of defendants. I am 
indebted to Professors Louis Kaplow and Sarah Fletcher for their elucidations on this point. 
104 For interesting discussions about the evidentiary and sentencing aspects of weight 
thresholds for controlled substances, see generally, e.g., Elizabeth McKinley, The 
Importance of Drug Quantity in Federal Sentencing: How Circuit Courts Should Determine 
the Mandatory Minimum Sentence for Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances in 
Light of United States v. Stoddard, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 1145 (2019) (discussing how courts 
must look to the specific controlled substance at issue and the weight of that substance to 
determine the penalties for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)); Leah Moyle, Ross Coomber 
& Jason Lowther, Crushing a Walnut with a Sledge Hammer? Analyzing the Penal Response 
to the Social Supply of Illicit Drugs, 22 SOC. LEG. STUD. 4 (2013) (criticizing the 2012 UK 
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drug that is greater than the threshold, he may be charged with selling- or 
distribution-related violations even though there might be no other corroborating 
evidence that they intended to sell or distribute the drug.105 The assumption is that 
the more of a drug someone possesses, the higher up in the distribution hierarchy 
they are, and thus the more deserving of punishment. Mandatory minimum 
sentences are based on this assumption, tying long sentences to drug quantity.106 
The problem is that these weight thresholds are set with little consideration for 
how people purchase and use drugs. Some thresholds are so low that a daily average 
dose for a user might be over the limit.107 People living in remote areas may purchase 
larger quantities if they only have sporadic access to a seller.108 Groups of 
individuals may also purchase larger quantities hoping to save money and minimize 
the risk of being caught by engaging in a single transaction rather than a series of 
them.109 Likewise, it is often the case that the individuals at the top of the drug 
distribution cartel rarely have drugs in their possession.110 Individuals who transport 
large quantities are usually lower in the distribution hierarchy but face more severe 
penalties.111 In other words, this policy makes it more difficult to accurately 
distinguish users from dealers. Figure 5 represents this reduction in accuracy. 
 
 
Drug Offences Definitive Guideline for using threshold quantities as proxies for the expected 
harm caused by drug dealers); Dana R. Hassin, How Much Is Too Much? Rule 704(b) 
Opinions on Personal Use vs. Intent to Distribute, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667 (2001) (arguing 
that FRE 704 (b) should apply to police officer testimony as to the connections between drug 
quantity and defendant’s presumed intent to distribute); see also DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, 
RETHINKING THE “DRUG DEALER” 29 (2019), www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa-
rethinking-the-drug-dealer_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/7E73-93KE] (calling for weight 
thresholds for possession that more accurately reflect the amount of a drug that people who 
use drugs could be reasonably expected to possess). 
105 DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 104, at 29 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-3401, 
13-3420). While other jurisdictions may not include weight thresholds in their drug laws, 
weight remains one of the primary factors that police and prosecutors use to argue that 
someone possessed drugs for sale or distribution rather than personal use. Id. (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 841; N.Y. Penal law §220.31). 
106 Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1492 (2000). 
107 DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 104, at 29. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (citing to Leah Moyle, Ross Coomber & Jason Lowther, Crushing a Walnut with 
a Sledge Hammer? Analyzing the Penal Response to the Social Supply of Illicit Drugs, 22 
SOC. LEG. STUD. 553, 565 (2013)). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 




When we move the Truly Guilty curve to the left, closer to the standard of 
proof, we notice an increase in the probability of mistaken acquittals. We can see 
the larger area occupied by the blue stripes plus the solid blue compared to only the 
solid blue area. Likewise, when we move the Truly Innocent curve to the right, we 
also see an increase in the probability of mistaken convictions. This is illustrated by 
the larger area of red stripes plus solid red relative to only the solid red area. This 
shift in both curves also causes a change in the corresponding ratio of the blue area 
to the red area (the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions). The new error 
distribution is less protective of defendants.112 For every false conviction, there are 
fewer false acquittals. 
The error distribution is also a function of how substantive law is formulated 
and applied. Consider, for instance, the debate between rules and standards.113 In its 
 
112 Like Figure 4, calculating the approximate probabilities of the color regions allows 
us to verify the argument. Suppose that changes in substantive law caused the Truly Innocent 
and Truly Guilty curves in Figure 5 to move one standard deviation to the right and the left, 
respectively. The new probability of wrong convictions (WC’’), the red solid and striped 
regions in Figure 5, is the area under the Truly Innocent curve that is greater than one 
standard deviation from the mean, or 0.1587. The new probability of wrong acquittals 
(WA’’), the blue solid and striped regions in Figure 5, is the area under the Truly Guilty 
curve that is less than zero standard deviations from the mean, or 0.5. In this scenario, the 
ratio of the new probabilities of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA’’/WC’’) is, thus, 
approximately 3. The new ratio of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA’’/WC’’) is 
lower than the initial ratio (WA/WC = ~7). As explained in the main text, a lower ratio 
represents an error-distribution less protective of defendants. 
113 For discussions about rules versus standards, see generally Gideon Parchomovsky 
& Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165 (2015); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
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simplest formulation, rules establish a triggering phenomenon and a consequence, 
whereas a standard usually defines a set of relevant considerations and options. 
Rules are generally thought to allow for better uniformity and certainty while 
introducing problems of over- and under-inclusion.114 In contrast, standards are 
thought to allow for greater flexibility and individualization while raising the risk of 
manipulability and indeterminacy.115 Translating these characteristics to our visual 
representations, when standards are used, we should expect a higher standard 
deviation along the Truly Guilty and Truly Innocent distributions due to the 
increased flexibility and individualization that are traditionally associated with 
standards. Figure 6 captures one (but not the only) way to illustrate this scenario and 




Figure 6 shows an increase in the number of false acquittals, represented by the 
difference between the solid blue area and the area with blue stripes plus the solid 
blue area. Likewise, the number of false convictions increases, indicated by the 
difference between the solid red area and the area with red stripes plus the solid red 
area. Interestingly, although we are assuming the effects of the proposed change 
affect both curves equally, we still see a change in the ratio between the areas under 
the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof and that under the Truly 
 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the 
Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
I am indebted to Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski and Edward Cheng for helpful discussions of 
this point.  
114 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 113, at 400. 
115 Id. 
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Innocent curve to the right (i.e., false acquittals to false convictions). The new error 
distribution is less protective of defendants.116  
Consider, now, the “serious potential risk of physical injury” standard in the 
now-defunct residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”). 
The ACCA imposes an enhanced sentence to defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g) (felon in possession of a firearm) with three or more prior convictions for 
a “violent felony,” a term defined by ACCA’s residual clause to include crimes that 
involve “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”117 In assessing whether a crime met the “serious potential risk of physical 
injury” standard, a court needed to ask “whether the conduct encompassed by the 
elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of 
injury to another.”118 That is, courts had to consider an idealized ordinary case of the 
crime, not how an individual offender acted in a particular situation.119 In explaining 
why attempted burglary poses a “serious potential risk of physical injury,” the 
Supreme Court said: “[a]n armed would-be burglar may be spotted by a police 
officer, a private security guard, or a participant in a neighborhood watch program . 
. . and a violent encounter may ensue.”120  
As result of the uncertainties with a “serious potential risk of physical injury” 
standard, courts differed significantly in their interpretation of which crimes 
constituted a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. The Supreme 
Court’s own precedent makes these disagreements clear. Between 2007 and 2011, 
the court held that the ACCA’s residual clause (1) covered Florida’s offense of 
attempted burglary;121 (2) did not cover New Mexico’s offense of driving under the 
influence;122 (3) did not cover Illinois’ offense of failure to report to a penal 
 
116 As before, the best way to verify this result is by calculating the approximate 
probabilities of the color regions. Figure 6 represents an increase in the standard deviation 
of both curves. Assuming the standard of proof remains the same as in Figures 4 and 5, it 
intersects the new Truly Innocent at a point less than two standard deviations from the mean, 
say one and a half standard deviations, and the new Truly Guilty curve at a point less than 
one standard deviation from the mean, say half of a standard deviation. The new probability 
of wrong convictions (WC’’’), the red solid and striped regions in Figure 6, is the area under 
the Truly Innocent curve that is greater than one and a half standard deviations from the 
mean, or 0.2266. The new probability of wrong acquittals (WA’’’), the region of the solid 
and striped region in Figure 6, is the area under the Truly Guilty curve that is less than half 
the standard deviation from the mean or 0.6915. In this scenario, the ratio of the new 
probabilities of wrong acquittals to wrong convictions (WA’’’/WC’’’) is, thus, 
approximately 3. The new ratio is lower than the initial ratio (WA/WC = ~7). A lower ratio 
represents an error-distribution less protective of defendants. 
117 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
118 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (emphasis added). 
119 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008). 
120 James, 550 U.S. at 211. 
121 Id. at 209. 
122 Begay, 553 U.S. at 142. 
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institution;123 and (4) covered Indiana’s offense of vehicular flight from a law 
enforcement officer.124  
After almost a decade of trying to clarify the “serious potential risk of physical 
injury” standard, the United States Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States 
that the ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process 
Clause.125 Writing for an 8–1 majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that the judicial 
assessment of risk to a judicially imagined “ordinary case” of a crime left grave 
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by the crime and how much risk 
was necessary for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.126 Taken together, these 
uncertainties produced more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 
Clause tolerates.127 
Once the ACCA’s residual clause was declared unconstitutional, all that is left 
were the bright-line rules defining “violent felony” as any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “(i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives[.]”128 Within our 
 
123 Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009). 
124 Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 13 (2011). 
125 Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015) (“Because the elements 
necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect, 
this abstract inquiry offers significantly less predictability than one that deals with the actual, 
not with an imaginary condition other than the facts.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 202 (2019). 
126 Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597–98 (“How does one go about deciding what kind of 
conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves? ‘A statistical analysis of the state reporter? 
A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?’”) (citing United States v. Mayer, 560 
F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
127 Constitutional challenges quickly followed regarding the similarly worded residual 
clause in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 189 F. Supp. 
3d 290 (D. Mass. 2016); United States v. Flannery, 230 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.R.I. 2017); Tosi 
v. United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127760 (D. Me. 2016); Carmona v. United States, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95212 (D.N.H. 2016). The Supreme Court in Beckles v. United 
States, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890 (2017), however, declined to extend the vagueness challenges to 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. More recently, the court struck down similar risk-based 
criminal statutes in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 (2018) (holding the definition 
of “aggravated felony” in the Immigration and Nationality Act was impermissibly vague) 
and U.S. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2339 (2019) (holding the residual clause in a federal 
statute providing mandatory minimum sentences based on firearm possessing was 
unconstitutionally vague). Another controversy that followed Johnson was whether 
defendants who had their sentences enhanced pursuant the ACCA’s residual clause could be 
resentenced. At issue was whether the rule announced in Johnson was “substantive” or 
“procedural.” In Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016), the Supreme Court 
held that the rule was substantive and, therefore, retroactive. 
128 Johnson, 576 U.S. at 606 (“Today’s decision does not call into question application 
of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a 
violent felony.”). 
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framework, when rules, instead of standards, are used we should expect cases to be 
clustered more closely around the mean of the Truly Guilty and Truly Innocent 
distributions given the higher degree of uniformity and certainty associated with 





Reducing the standard deviation of the Truly Guilty distribution corresponds 
with a decrease in the area under this curve to the left of the standard of proof line. 
This is visually represented in Figure 7 by the difference between the area with blue 
stripes and the area with solid blue plus the blue stripes area. The reduced standard 
deviation of the Truly Innocent distribution also translates into a decrease in the area 
representing false convictions, as shown above by the difference between the area 
with red stripes and the area with solid red plus the red stripes area. Similar to the 
situation depicted in Figure 6, although the change affects both curves equally, it 
still yields a new error distribution. But, here, the new error distribution is more 
protective of defendants.129 
 
129 Figure 7 represents a decrease in the standard deviations of both curves. Assuming 
the standard of proof remains the same as in Figures 4-6, it intersects the new Truly Innocent 
at a point more than two standard deviations from the mean, say two and a half standard 
deviations, and the new Truly Guilty curve at a point more than one standard deviation from 
the mean, say one and a half of a standard deviation. The new probability of wrong 
convictions (WC’’’’), the red striped region in Figure 7, is the area under the Truly Innocent 
curve that is greater than three and a half standard deviations from the mean, or 0.0062. The 
new probability of wrong acquittals (WA’’’’), the blue striped region in Figure 7, is the area 
under the Truly Guilty curve that is less than one and a half standard deviations from the 
mean, or 0.0668. In this scenario, the ratio of the new probabilities of wrong acquittals to 
 










Apparent Guilt   
Standard of  Proof  
Figure 7
472 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
3.  The Racially Disparate Effects on the Error-Distribution 
 
Figures 1–7 represent abstract scenarios intended to make a series of analytical 
points clear. Notably missing from the foregoing discussion are explicit and implicit 
disparities that permeate the legal system and target different racial groups 
disproportionally.130 Racial inequalities are pervasive in the criminal justice system. 
Although Blacks make up only 13% of the United States population, they account 
for 40% of the imprisoned population.131 Blacks are five times more likely than 
Whites to be incarcerated.132 This rate is substantially higher than other minority 
groups. Latinos, for instance, are “only” 65% more likely to be incarcerated than 
Whites.133 Research has uncovered and explored evidence of racial inequalities in 
 
wrong convictions (WA’’’’/WC’’’’) is, thus, approximately 11. The new ratio is higher than 
the initial ratio (WA/WC = ~7). A higher ratio represents an error-distribution more 
protective of defendants. 
130 For seminal works, see generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 
(1997) (emphasizing the important role race plays in the administration of justice system); 
CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR (1993) (discussing the 
racially disparate impact of all-white juries); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE 
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992) (arguing that racism is a permanent feature of 
American society); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006) (exploring how race 
shaped the “tough on crime” narrative and policies); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW (2010) (arguing that the mass incarceration of Blacks has led to the same societal roots 
and consequences as in the Reconstruction Era); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON 
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME : THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 
(2016) (arguing that Johnson’s war on poverty laid the foundation for the mass incarceration 
during the Nixon and Reagan administrations); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK 
COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016) 
(describing in great detail how implicit bias as to race shapes criminal court in one Illinois 
county). 
131 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html 
[https://perma.cc/9AGM-CJGS]. Several explanations have been proposed for racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system, including income levels, access to quality counsel, 
and jurors’ racial bias. See Amanda Agan, Matthew Freedman & Emily Owens, Is Your 
Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24579, 2018); James M. Anderson & Paul 
Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on 
Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012); Tara L. Mitchell & Christian A. 
Meissner, Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621 (2005). 
132 Black Disparities in Youth Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (Sept. 12, 
2017), www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Black-Disparities-in-
Youth-Incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG76-BJVH]. 
133 Latino Disparities in Youth Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 2017), 
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Latino-Disparities-in-Youth-
Incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2U-NQ9F].  
2021] EVIDENTIARY POLICIES THROUGH OTHER MEANS 473 
 
policing,134 charging,135 bail,136 plea bargaining,137 sentencing,138 and, relevant for 
our purposes, guilt determination.139  
There are multiple ways we can represent these profound racial disparities 
within this Article’s framework. Figure 8 below uses a left-skewed distributions 
(i.e., with the mean to the left of its median and mode) to represent the harsher guilt 
determination of which Black defendants are often the target. Figure 9, in turn, uses 
right-skewed distributions (i.e., with the mean to the right of its median and mode) 
to illustrate how White defendants are persistently perceived more leniently.  
 
 
134 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop 
and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397 (2017); CHARLES R. 
EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY, & DONALD HAIDER-MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE 
STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
135 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans 
Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2000); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. 
Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587 
(1985). 
136 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in 
Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994) (finding thirty-five percent higher bail amounts 
for Black defendants). 
137 See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the 
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008); Marc L. Miller, Domination & 
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211 (2004).  
138 See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities 
in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEG. STUD. 75 (2015); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and 
Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 
285 (2001); David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman & Neil Alan Weiner, 
Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and 
Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998). 
139 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana 
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & 
Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012); Justin D. 
Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and 
Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010) (suggesting that implicit 
bias influenced how jurors assessed defendants’ apparent guilt); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian 
Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty-/Not Guilty Implicit 
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010) (finding that participants showed an 
implicit negative attitude toward Blacks and an implicit stereotype between Black and 
guilty). 






Importantly, Figures 8 and 9 give us a visual representation of an underexplored 
form of racial disparity in our criminal justice system: Black defendants are often 
subject to an error distribution that is noticeably less protective than White 
defendants. Looking at Figure 8 and comparing the left-skewed distribution to a 
normal distribution, we see that the probability of false acquittals (i.e., the blue area 
under the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof) decreases 
significantly, while the probability of false convictions (i.e., the red area under the 
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Truly Innocent curve to the right of the standard of proof) increases.140 In other 
words, under certain conditions, a left-skewed distribution results in a lower ratio of 
false acquittals to every false conviction. A lower ratio represents an error-
distribution less protective of defendants. For every false conviction, there are fewer 
false acquittals. 
Figure 9, in turn, illustrates another form of racial disparity seldom discussed 
by legal scholarship: White defendants are often afforded a more protective error 
distribution than Black defendants. Comparing the right-skewed distribution to a 
normal distribution, we see that false acquittals (i.e., the blue area under the Truly 
Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof) increase, while the probability of 
false convictions (i.e., the red area under the Truly Innocent curve to the right of the 
standard of proof) decreases. In other words, under certain circumstances, right-
skewed distributions can represent a ratio of more false acquittals to every false 
conviction. A higher ratio of false acquittals to false convictions in an error-
distribution is more protective of defendants. For every false conviction, there are 
more false acquittals. 
Reforms in substantive law that affect the accuracy of legal fact-finding may 
aggravate these disparities in the error distribution between Black and White 
defendants.141 Figures 10 and 11 show the disparate racial impacts that legal reforms 




140 For more technical explanations, see supra notes 103 and 112. 
141 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  




Figure 10 illustrates a less accurate legal fact-finding apparatus in terms of the 
Truly Innocent and Truly Guilty having more similar levels of apparent guilt (i.e., 
their curves are closer together). Like in Figure 8 above, Black defendants are 
represented with left-skewed distributions. Once we approach the means of both 
curves to reflect a loss in accuracy, we see how the probability of false convictions 
(i.e., the red area under the Truly Guilty curve to the left of the standard of proof) 
increases comparatively more than the probability of false acquittals (i.e., the blue 
area under the Truly Innocent curve to the right of the standard of proof).142 Under 
these conditions, Figure 10 shows that a decrease in accuracy can lead to a lower 
ratio of false acquittals to false convictions among Black defendants. A lower ratio 
of false acquittals to false convictions represents an error-distribution less protective 
of defendants. 
Turning to Figure 11, we see that, for White defendants, the same decrease in 
accuracy leads to the opposite result. After the loss of accuracy is accounted for, we 
see how the probability of false convictions (i.e., the red area under the Truly Guilty 
curve to the left of the standard of proof) increases comparatively less than the 
probability of false acquittals (i.e., the blue area under the Truly Innocent curve to 
the right of the standard of proof). This suggests that, under certain conditions, a 
decrease in accuracy leads to a higher ratio of false acquittals to false convictions 
for right-skewed distributions. A higher ratio of false acquittals to false convictions 
in an error-distribution is more protective of defendants. These representations show 
how legal reforms that, perhaps unexpectedly, reduce the accuracy of legal fact-
finding, such as establishing weight thresholds for drug-related offenses as discussed 
above, might have very disparate impacts on how errors are distributed for Black 
defendants in comparison to White defendants. 
 
142 For more technical explanations, see supra notes 103 and 112. 
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These seemingly technical findings have profound practical implications for 
individuals’ procedural due process safeguards.143 When discussing the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court made clear 
that the prosecution must establish every key element of its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.144 Justice Brennan went so far as to say that the standard of proof in criminal 
cases plays “a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.”145  
The constitutional requirement of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in 
criminal cases is based significantly on the idea that the higher standard of proof is 
pivotal to enforce an error distribution strongly eschewed in favor of criminal 
defendants.146 This Article has shown several ways in which changes in substantive 
law can move us away from what procedural due process requires. Discussion about 
substantive law reforms, however, rarely raise this possibility. This omission can 
come at high costs for criminal defendants’ procedural due process safeguards, 
especially for members of minority groups who might be already unfairly treated 
based on societal prejudices and stereotypes. 
  
 
143 For discussions of procedural due process, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 
(1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); see generally Lawrence Alexander, 
The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 
39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that “meaning of procedural due process is 
determined by the various substantive constitutional values at stake”); Martin H. Redish & 
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (claiming that a procedural due process promotes 
equality); Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of 
Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984) (critiquing the 
Supreme Court’s development of a positivist due process doctrine). 
144 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Due process commands that no man 
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the 
factfinder of his guilt.”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958)). 
145 Id. at 363. 
146 There are different reasons in favor of an error distribution in favor of defendants 
having to do with liberty, constraints on State power, confidence of the community in 
applications of the criminal law, and others. See, e.g., id. at 364 (“Where one party has at 
stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of 
error [in fact-finding] is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the 
burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”) (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525–26); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 757 (1982) (“Standards of proof, like other ‘procedural due process rules[,] are shaped 
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, 
not the rare exceptions.’”) (quoting Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344) (alteration and emphasis in 
original); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980) (noting that “[o]nce a state has granted 
prisoners a liberty interest, we held that due process protections are necessary ‘to insure that 
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated’”) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 557 (1974)).  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Changes in substantive law can move away from a defendant-friendly error 
distribution, with potentially high costs for defendants’ procedural due process and 
other safeguards, especially for minorities. This approach is very different from the 
one we employ today. Currently, the potential effects that changes in substantive 
laws might cause in the error distribution in a particular area of law or type of case 
virtually always go unnoticed. When discussing legal reforms, lawmakers rarely, if 
ever, explicitly weigh the consequences for evidentiary policies in general and the 
error-distribution in particular. This Article shows how such omissions are 
dangerous. Just like decisions about “procedure” can be disguised as Trojan horses 
for changing individuals’ substantive rights, so too can decisions about “substance” 
unnoticeably affect defendants’ procedural due process safeguards. We should 
always be aware of unexpected ways a legal change might influence our legal and 
constitutional landscape. This is cause for both optimism and caution as new policy 
tools become available. We can pursue evidentiary policies through many different 
means. 
